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Abstract. Although the Brazilian Federal regulation approach against deforestation 
has been effective with large landowners, it has little touched smallholders and may 
have aggravated their poverty conditions. In this context, REDD+ is seen by many 
institutions as a useful tool to promote conservation by small farmers, as it could 
encourage a transition towards alternatives livelihoods, which would reduce 
deforestation. In the context of a REDD+ pilot project in São Felix do Xingu, we 
aimed at analysing the perceptions of deforestation by small farmers and what would 
bring them to stop. We concluded that an investment-based scheme might be more 
effective than a use-restricting payment, given that support in the form of technical 
assistance is essential for most of them. More specifically three groups are identified: 
the environmentalists, the innovators and the objectors. They each have very different 
needs to reduce deforestation, questioning the relevance of one-fits-it-all solutions 
even for an investment scheme. A REDD+ project would have to adapt to this 
diversity by offering various forms of support. This has implications both for the 
equity within a REDD+ project and the control of conditionality.  
1 Introduction 
While the deforestation rate in Brazil declined by 84% between 2004 and 
2012, in terms of GHG emissions due to land-use change Brazil is still second 
after Indonesia. In 2004 Brazil started taking a series of command-and-control 
measures tor reduce deforestation, following a top-down approach. This 
approach was largely successful in tackling large farmers, but only marginally 
affected the behaviour of small farmers, and often aggravated their poverty 
conditions (Assunção et al. 2013).  
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In the face of a dramatic lack of technical and financial means but also of 
environmental awareness of small farmers, there is a need to incentivize them 
economically to this transition. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD+) is a programme, which is believed to play this role. It 
is based on the assumption that developing countries have an opportunity cost 
when they decide to preserve their forest instead of converting it towards 
other land uses. As in Payments for Environmental Services (PES), which aim 
at compensating people for conserving environmental services, REDD+ aims 
at providing economic incentives for people to maintain forest services, 
including carbon sequestration, but also water provision and purification. 
After being largely discussed theoretically and politically in the international 
arenas, countries are now to choose concrete REDD+ actions and programs to 
implement the REDD+ projects and benefit from the financial compensation. 
REDD+ is considered as an interesting instrument to incentivize small 
farmers to replace their slash-and-burn practices for cattle-farming with 
sustainable alternative productions, which reduce deforestation (Angelsen 
2008 in: Kanowski 2011).  In this stage of concrete REDD+ actions, NGOs 
appear as essential actors, and they have been taking the lead by proposing 
pilot projects, to create positive incentives for conservation and the promotion 
of a sustainable model of production for farmers. In this analysis we are going 
to evaluate the potential of REDD+ to encourage farmers on this transition.  
 
Contrarily to Angelsen (2008), Karsenty (2012) considers that a REDD+ 
project will not necessarily be effective in encouraging a reduction of 
deforestation. One of the main risks of REDD+ projects is that they result in 
one-fits-it-all solutions, such as the PES programmes, which apply in the 
same way to all resource users, without analysing their needs to change their 
practices more in detail (Karsenty 2012). Therefore, the effectiveness of such 
incentives will strongly depend on the instruments used to encourage them 
this way and whether they are adapted to their needs. Given that the small 
farmers’ needs to change their practices can vary greatly, any incentive policy 
or mechanism to encourage such a transition needs to take into account this 
diversity of actors.  
 
This is why we raised the following question:  
What are the implications of a REDD+ project for taking into account 
the diversity of small farmers and their needs to stop deforesting and 
make a transition towards sustainable land-use practices?  
 
The goal of this study is to understand how the governance of a REDD+ 
project could take into account this diversity of small farmers. For this 
purpose, we carried out an exploratory study in São Felix do Xingu, one of 
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the most deforesting municipalities, to analyse what type of REDD+ measures 
could encourage a change of practices by small farmers. The NGO The 
Nature Conservancy (TNC) is currently planning a REDD+ pilot project in 
this municipality. Our reflexions are based upon interviews with 
representatives of local institutions and small farmers, that we led in 
cooperation with the Association for the Development of Small Farmers in the 
Alto Xingu (Adafax).1 
 
In the following, we will first describe the political dynamics and the 
efforts led at the federal and local levels to tackle deforestation. Secondly, we 
present the methodology we used to analyse the current situation of the 
municipality of São Felix and of small farmers. Interviews with local 
institutions allowed us to understand how REDD+ is viewed by the different 
actors and how they consider its potential to promote a transition towards 
sustainable alternatives to cattle-farming within the municipality. Interviews 
with small farmers aimed at identifying their needs to reduce deforestation 
and transition towards sustainable alternatives. We will show how their needs 
differ according to the different types of farmers, calling for different 
measures. Based on these results, we raise some questions regarding the 
governance of a REDD+ project capable of taking into account the actors’ 
diversity. We conclude with some recommendations for the conception of a 
REDD+ project at the municipal level. 
2 Policies against deforestation in Brazil and perspectives for 
REDD+ 
2.1 The on-going fight against deforestation in Brazil 
Deforestation is one of the main drivers of climate change, it accounts for 
18% of GHG emissions globally (Meridien Institute, 2011). The Brazilian 
Amazon represents one third of the world’s tropical forest. While annual 
deforestation rates in the Brazilian Amazon declined by almost 84% between 
2004 and 2012, deforestation still accounted for 57% of Brazil’s annual 
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions in 2009 and makes Brazil the 6th global 
emitter (UNEP/GRID 2009). One of the main drivers of land-use change is 
cattle farming. In the region called Legal Amazon, comprising the entire 
tropical forest within Brazil’s borders, a total of 74 million cattle are at the 
origin of deforestation and degradation (IBGE/PPM 2010). Cattle-farming 
highly contributes to GHG emissions in Brazil, not only through the practice 
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of deforestation through burning but also through the methane emitted by the 
cattle (May and Millikan 2010).  
 
Since the 1950’s the federal government of Brazil had promoted 
deforestation as a way of territorial conquest and occupation. Nevertheless, 
when deforestation reached a historical high with over 25 000 km2 deforested 
in 2004, the Brazilian Federal government took strong regulatory action 
against deforestation. A flagship example for its regulatory approach is the 
2004 Action Plan for Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Brazilian 
Amazon (PPCDAm for its acronyms in Portuguese), forming part of the Plan 
for a Sustainable Amazon. The main idea of the plan is to reduce deforestation 
through command-and-control measures, while promoting an institutional 
culture, which stimulates legal activities through market incentives, social 
control and capacity-building (Barreto et Araújo 2012). 
 
Facing an increase of deforestation in December 2007, the government 
launched a presidential decree targeted towards the “Arch of Deforestation” or 
“Fire Arch”, reaching from the North-East of the Amazon region (Maranhão 
and Pará) to the South-West (Amazonas and Rondônia). In this zone, the 
government identified the most deforesting municipalities and implemented 
restrictive measures such as the restriction of access to rural credits for 
farmers who did not have any proof of legitimately owning their lands or of 
environmental regularity, among other measures (Assunção et al. 2012). The 
regulations were complemented by very strong law enforcement and market 
measures such as embargoes on beef production, which led to a significant 
reduction of deforestation (Barreto and Araújo 2012; Nepstad et al. 2009). 
However, this command-and-control approach was not accompanied by 
adequate supportive measures for small farmers. The most recent regulation is 
the reform of the Forest Code, approved by President Dilma’s federal 
government in 2012. It requires that farmers with properties of over 4 rural 
modules (approximately 300 ha in the Amazon region) maintain 80% of 
forests on their properties (or 50% if they have already cleared their land), 
which corresponds to the “Legal Reserve”. They also must conserve the 
forests around water sources and streams, and on hills, the so-called 
“Permanent Protected Areas” (Senado Brasileiro 2012).  
 
The environmental decentralization process in the Amazon has also 
contributed to decrease the deforestation rates since 2005. Environment and 
forest policies have been transferred to the states and municipalities, which 
have progressively strengthened the governance on these sub-national levels. 
An important aspect of this process was the creation of institutional forums on 
the state level for environmental policies and forest management (May and 
Millikan 2010). The forest police IBAMA signed various cooperation 
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agreements with state agencies in the Amazon to delegate responsibilities to 
the state level for allowing forest cleaning or to accept sustainable 
management plans. However, the decentralization process is far from being 
achieved and the local levels still lack institutional, technical and financial 
capacities. In particular, local governments still face significant difficulties to 
address the problem of land reform and the National Institute for colonisation 
and Land Reform (INCRA) is the only competent institution for this issue. 
Despite of the efforts to delimitate clearly the properties and to clarify the 
legitimate claims, property rights are still highly uncertain in the Amazon (one 
third of the land claims are not entirely verified) (May and Millikan 2010).  
2.2 Emerging political efforts to reduce deforestation in São Felix do 
Xingu 
The municipality of São Felix do Xingu, situated in the State of Pará 
(responsible for 57% of Brazil’s GHG emissions in 2009) has one of the 
highest deforestation rates in the Amazon since 2001, and as part of the “Fire 
Arch,” the Brazilian government considers it as one of its priority 
municipalities for preventing, monitoring and controlling illegal deforestation 
(Guimarães et al. 2011). It is the second largest municipality of Brazil and the 
municipality with the largest cattle herd, with over two million heads. Cattle-
farming is the main economic activity, due to the high rent of cattle, its secure 
and immediate return and the little required effort, leading to important 
extension of pasture areas. Any other type of production cannot be sold easily, 
as there is very limited commercialization and the roads are still in a very bad 
state. 
 
Following the 2009 federal edict for embargo on cattle production from 
São Felix, the local government signed a Pact Against Illegal Deforestation, 
as required by the state and federal government, with the representatives of 
the agricultural sector. It also established a Commission of this Pact, to 
initiate inclusive environmental governance in this municipality. The 
involvement of small farmers in this environmental governance has been a 
crucial step after their exclusion from previous political processes. The 
members of the Commission meet once a month to discuss the specific issues 
within 5 sub-commissions. Its goal is to define a post-pact agenda to sustain 
anti-deforestation efforts in the long-term. However, it lacks a clear decision-
making process and financial resources, given that it currently relies on the 
funding by the NGO The Nature Conservancy (TNC).  
 
In 2010, the “Green Arch” program implemented measures to help the 
municipality exit the list of the “Fire Arch” and promoted the creation of 
municipal institutions, and an increased access to credit and capacity-building. 
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For a municipality to exit the list, it has to reduce the annual rate of 
deforestation to 40 km2, regularize 80% of its private lands, and delimitate 
80% of the properties clearly with the CAR. The NGO TNC decided to 
support São Felix mainly with the delimitation of properties through the CAR, 
and has achieved 78% of the private area (with no overlapping properties). All 
these measures led to a significant decrease of the annual rate of deforestation; 
while 877 km2 were deforested in 2007, only 140 km2 were in 2011. 
However, this still wasn’t enough to exit the list and now small farmers need 
to be included in further efforts of deforestation reduction. The CAR allowed 
to estimate the total number of farmers to around 8000. Small farmers (who 
own less than 300 ha) represent 86% of the farmers, but only 24% of the area 
of private lands; the average size of their property is 125 ha. In the 
assentamentos (agrarian reform settlements), areas that are in the process of 
being redistributed to landless farmers, 4000 small farmers own properties of 
around 50 ha.   
 
Small farmers have suffered from the strong regulation approach of the 
Brazilian government accompanied by sanctions of the forest police, the 
IBAMA. They need adequate public policies of support in order to be able to 
comply with the environmental regulations of the government. Despite its 
success in reducing overall deforestation, the regulatory approach of the “Fire 
Arch” did not prove to be effective for the small farmers in the long-term 
(Coudel et al. 2011). In fact the small farmers’ share in deforestation has 
increased in the past few years. Deforestation of small areas increased in 
comparison to deforestation of large areas; the share of deforested areas above 
50 ha went from 78% to 25% between 2002 and 2008, while the share of 
deforested areas below 25 ha decreased from 21% to 58% (NORAD 2011). 
This could mean that large farmers deforested smaller areas (and not 
necessarily that the share of deforestation by small farmers increased). 
However, deforested areas of less than 25 ha are generally linked with small 
farmers, while large farmers are necessarily responsible for deforested areas 
above 50 ha. For small farmers, income is still directly correlated with the 
deforested area through the common practice of slash-and-burn. 
 
To overcome the dichotomy between development and the protection of the 
environment for small farmers, there is a need to reduce deforestation while 
increasing the small farmers’ revenues. A transition towards sustainable 
alternatives to cattle farming, that are profitable but without implying 
deforestation of new areas, would be one possibility to combine the small 
farmers’ development with the conservation of the world’s most important 
ecosystem. In São Felix do Xingu, one of the main alternatives identified is 
the production of cocoa, which can be more profitable than cattle farming. 
The next step of this transition is to produce a wider variety of products, 
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including fruits and vegetables, while reducing progressively the share of 
cattle. The transition would be accomplished with the so-called Agro-forestry 
system (SAF), which includes a sustainable forest management with yearly 
wood extractions complementing the revenue. This last stage requires a 
significant initial investment and a long-term vision of the property, which 
many small famers, constrained by their immediate needs, often lack (Adafax 
2012). 
2.3 REDD+ as an instrument to encourage small farmers to transition 
Given these remaining challenges for reducing deforestation on the national 
and local level, Brazil has been contemplating REDD+ as a potentially 
interesting instrument to access international funding, reinforce technical 
assistance and address poverty as a driver of deforestation.  
 
The official adoption of REDD+ as a compensation mechanism between 
countries has been debated since 2001 in the international climate negotiations 
due to its highly difficult implementation. Since the beginning, Brazil has 
been participating actively in the international debate on this mechanism. 
Brazilian researchers around Santilli proposed in 2005 a “compensated 
reduction” proposal, including avoided deforestation. The main element of the 
proposal was the stabilisation and voluntary reduction of deforestation in non-
Annexe I countries (not committed to emissions reductions under the Kyoto 
Protocol) (Santilli et al. 2003; Santilli et al. 2005). The second “D” in REDD+ 
was added in the 13th COP in Bali, when countries of the Congo Bassin 
insisted that not only deforestation but also degradation should also be 
included in the mechanism. Then, the “plus” referring to conservation, 
sustainable management and enhancement of carbon stocks became part of 
the official REDD+ designation in the COP 15 in Copenhagen.  
 
While the international community received the theoretical idea with 
interest, its concrete implementation is still subject to fierce debates. One of 
the main challenges of this economic incentive instrument is that it is very 
complicated to evaluate the performance in terms of deforestation reduction. 
The drivers of deforestation and degradation reach from the extraction of oil 
and mines to industrial farming of palm oil or small-scale farming. Financial 
incentives could only cover the low opportunity costs due to limited funds but 
also because such an international mechanism would not want to encourage 
palm oil developers to ask for plantation permits only to obtain the 
compensation (Karsenty 2012).    
 
This is why, for Karsenty (2012), a more pragmatic approach ought to 
define performance criteria beyond the emission reductions, including proxies 
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for all measurable activities, which contribute to reduce deforestation. 
Performance should therefore relate to a series of indicators measuring the 
effective implementation of deforestation reduction measures. In this sense, 
performance requires investments to strengthen governance and institutional 
capacity (Karsenty 2012).  
  
In the case of small-scale farming, a direct payment would be feasible due 
to the low opportunity cost. However, it is worth questioning whether a direct 
payment under the use-restricting approach is the best solution for small 
farmers on the long-term. For PES, the use restricting approach is solely a 
financial compensation for the non-use of natural resources while an asset-
building approach aims at encouraging a change of practices towards more 
sustainable production types, through investments (Wunder 2007). Pirard et 
al. (2010) have a broader definition of asset-building, including the transition 
from an extensive to an intensive agricultural system, capacity-building and 
development of infrastructures for alternatives activities to cattle-farming. 
Thus, “farmers would benefit from the possibility to use technologies, 
allowing them to increase their production and their income, while reducing 
deforestation” (Pirard and Treyer 2010).  
 
A use-restricting PES creates a continuous assistance triggering a long-term 
dependence on the payment. Moreover it is detrimental to the poor, for whom 
resource-extracting activities are the only way to survive and they rely most 
on these resources. The average opportunity cost of the community will be 
lower than their own opportunity cost, while they loose their vital access 
rights to the resource (Karsenty 2011). Such a compensation scheme allows  
the small farmers to survive, but does not release the necessary capital to 
engage in a new technical path of agricultural or agro-forestry production on 
the long-term (Ibid). The risks of corruption and appropriation by elites are 
increased if cash payments, while monitoring and control of investments are 
slightly more effective (Ibid).  
 
An asset-building scheme could finance the transition from current 
agricultural practices, such as slash-and-burn practices, towards sustainable 
production systems. This would allow reconciling the conservation of 
environmental services with better living conditions of the small farmers 
(Karsenty 2011). Costa (2008) showed that in the Brazilian Amazon, paying 
the opportunity cost is less promising than providing the necessary conditions 
towards alternative land uses. Costa Rica was one of the pioneering countries 
in this domain; it spent its PES program funds, raised through a tax of oil 
distribution, partly on community investments (Pagiola 2008). Since the 
transition towards alternative production models is a reorientation process, it 
requires changing the entire socio-economic model, including the technology, 
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economic, ecologic, socio-cultural and institutional sectors. A REDD+ project 
oriented towards community investments and asset-building is more likely to 
address these multiple drivers, according to Karsenty (2012).  
3 Methodology 
The association Adafax generously received us in São Felix do Xingu, but 
was also our intermediary to meet the local institutions and small farmers in 
their communities during the six weeks we spent on the field. Thanks to their 
good insertion within the institutional mosaic in the municipality, the 
association enabled the contact with the representatives of all the local 
institutions we interviewed.  
 
Due to the transport challenges in the municipality, we could not travel to 
the farmers’ communities autonomously. We therefore accompanied the 
Adafax technicians when they had meetings with farmers. Their presence also 
helped to enjoy the farmers’ trust and make them feel more comfortable. The 
selection of the farmer sample was widely determined by the communities we 
were able to visit during our six-week-stay in São Felix do Xingu. However, 
within each community, we tried to choose farmers with different profiles in 
terms of production types, age, sex and poverty level. The small size of our 
14-farmer sample, insufficient to obtain significant results, can be explained 
by the limited time we could spend in São Felix, the limited availability of the 
farmers and the transport difficulty. 
3.1 Interviews with local institutions 
A semi-open questionnaire was used to carry out 18 interviews with local 
institutions in São Felix do Xingu. After a series of questions on the 
institution itself, its evolution, its activities and its relations with other 
institutions, our goal was to find out the institution’s position regarding the 
recent efforts of the municipality to exit the “Fire Arch”. We aimed at 
understanding how the institution perceived the recent changes, which ways 
of reducing deforestation were considered most effective, which technical 
projects should be prioritised, what they considered the needs of farmers to be 
and what are the challenges faced by the municipality. Lastly, we questioned 
the institution regarding its position to REDD+, by asking whether they had 
already participated in discussions on the issue, which institution would be 
most adequate to govern and monitor such projects, how it could be included 
in the panoply of existing policies and which activities should be concretely 
financed.  
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The institutions we interviewed all worked with farmers or affect them with 
their policies. Amongst them were public institutions for agriculture and land 
reform from municipal, state and federal levels, but also banks, unions, 
technical assistance organisations and NGOs. For these institutions, we 
decided to synthesize the responses of the interviews without any factorial 
analysis, given that the objective of these interviews was to clarify the 
political process in São Felix.  
3.2 Interviews with small farmers 
We also interviewed 14 small farmers from different communities of the 
municipality São Felix do Xingu to analyse their perception of deforestation 
and its alternatives. It was crucial for us to obtain comparable responses by 
avoiding that the farmers deviate from the questions or answer with usual 
discourses.  
 
We introduced the interview with four general questions in order to have an 
idea of their characteristics, mainly the size of their property and their main 
production. To facilitate comparison, we chose to use the Q Methodology, 
developed by William Stephenson (Stephenson 1953) and used in 
comparative psychology or “science of subjectivity” (Brown 1980). The 
objective is to identify similarities and differences between the responses of a 
sample of persons. Since the responses are discrete on a scale of agreement 
and disagreement (strongly agree, agree, indifferent, disagree, strongly 
disagree), this method enables to study which opinion statements were 
similarly graded and which ones strongly differed.   
 
Each farmer was confronted with a series of opinion statements, which he 
had to classify according to his level of agreement or disagreement. The 
repartition of their responses was predetermined, following a Gauss curve: the 
Q classification. To facilitate the procedure, the opinion statements were 
written on cards that the farmers had to place on a paperboard (figure 1).  
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Fig. 1. Example of interview using the Q methodology 
The opinion statements, pre-written by the research team, referred to 8 
topics: the perception by the farmer of its farm, his capacity to change 
practices, his perception of environmental regulations, of deforestation, of his 
responsibility, his needs to be able to stop deforesting, his perception of a 
payment for conserving forests and the modalities of such a payment.  
 
Box 1. The 29 opinion statements 
The farmer’s vision of his property  
1. I want to stay on my property because I like working here. 
2. I am living here because I do not have any other employment opportunities.  
3. I want to improve my property for my sons and grandsons.  
 
Capacity to change practices  
4. I do not know very well how to change my farming practices.  
5. I am looking for new practices, which would allow me to produce without 
degrading the environment.  
 
Perception of environmental regulation  
6. I am worried that I will not be able to stay any longer on my property because of 
increasing environmental regulation.  
7. For me it is easier to adapt to environmental regulation than for other farmers. 
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Perception of deforestation  
8.   I think that deforesting is the only way for me to produce sufficiently.   
9.   I think that I could earn enough without having to deforest.  
10. Financial profitability determines everything I do on my property.  
11. If I could produce more on my property, I could stop deforesting.  
12. I stopped deforesting because of the increasing controls and sanctions.  
13. I stopped deforesting because I like my forest.  
 
Responsibility of the farmer  
14. I think that I have the right to deforest because I produce food for others.  
15. Farmers have the right to manage their property as they please.  
16. Farmers who damage the environment have to be punished more severely.  
17. There is enough environmental regulation and they should stop bothering us. 
 
Needs of the farmer 
18. To be able to stop deforesting, I need new production types.  
19. With new credit lines, I could produce more.  
20. I think I could only produce more with more machines.  
21. My biggest problem is to sell my production.  
22. With more technical assistance I could improve my production.  
 
Perception of a payment to stop deforesting 
23. With a payment to stop deforesting, I would buy food and cloths.  
24. With a payment to stop deforesting, I would invest to produce more.  
25. If I do not obtain any payment for my forest, it does not have any benefits for me. 
 
Modalities of such a payment 
26. Such a payment should be determined according to the size of the forest.  
27. Such a payment should benefit more the small farmers.  
28. In a municipal program against deforestation, the priority should be support to the 
farmers.  
29. In a municipal program against deforestation, the priority should be a payment for 
the farmers.  
 
The interviews took 30 minutes on average, eventually more if they did not 
immediately understand the methodology. The challenge of the Q 
methodology was that many farmers did not understand why they could not 
agree or disagree with as many opinion statements as they wanted, but there 
was a limited allowed number for each response. Sometimes we had to place 
the card ourselves on the paperboard after asking them which of the 
statements was more important than the others. However, the advantage of the 
Q methodology was that farmers were very open to expose their difficulties 
and disposed to cooperate with such an interactive, tactile and dynamic 
methodology. Many farmers told us that they found this methodology 
interesting and original.  
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4 Panorama of institutions and dynamics in São Felix do Xingu 
Through the 18 interviews with the local institutions of São Felix do Xingu, 
we obtained a clearer vision of the actors, their interactions and the internal 
dynamics they create. We classified the organisations we interviewed into 4 
groups:  
- NGOs which detain a political role in São Felix, including Adafax, Gret and 
TNC;  
- Technical assistance organisms, including Emater, Cootagro, Procampo, 
Ceplac and Cappru;  
- Public institutions, such as the Municipal Environment Secretary 
(SEMMAS), the Federal Environment Secretary (SEMA), the Municipal 
Agriculture Secretary (SEMAGRI) and the National Institute for Colonisation 
et Land Reform (INCRA); the bank providing most rural credits is the BASA. 
- and organisations representing social movements, including the Union of 
Rural Workers  (STTR), the Union of Rural Producers (SPR), the Rural 
Family House (CFR), and the Pastoral Commission for Land (CPT).  
4.1 A municipality based on cattle-farming  
In São Felix do Xingu, the financial return on cattle is secure, simple and 
immediate given that cattle can be displaced by foot, which explains why 
cattle is the only productive model that farmers know in this municipality, 
according to the INCRA. The profitability of cattle is very high given that 
labour costs are low. Many cattle favouring dynamics became very common 
in this municipality, including slash-and-burn practices to extend the pastures, 
which makes it hard to change them, says a representative of the Emater.  
 
On the contrary, selling other products is still very complicated in the 
municipality because of the bad state of the roads, representing a challenge to 
the transport. A representative of the Cootagro explains that high production 
costs make it cheaper to import these products form other states. Other 
obstacles are the lack of technical assistance and credits, the weak training by 
the Rural Family House and the stringent sanitary legislation, according to 
him. A representative of the Pastoral Commission for Land explained that 
technicians, bankers and politicians all benefit from credit projects based on 
cattle for small farmers, encouraged by gifts from large producers. The lack of 
environmental awareness of small farmers and the difficult communication in 
such as large municipality as São Felix also contribute to the dominance of 
cattle-farming and the high deforestation rates according to the Municipal 
Environment Secretary. However, in the past decade, farmers increasingly 
produced cocoa, thanks to the technical assistance made available by Ceplac 
and the easy commercialization through the cooperative Cappru.  
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4.2 Progress and remaining challenges in the fight against deforestation 
At the moment when the Pact Against Illegal Deforestation was established in 
the municipality, the SEMMAS was remodelled, equipped and its personnel 
trained. Training of institutions but also technicians was the objective of the 
Project Pacto Xingu of the MMA, financed by the German Cooperation 
Agency (GIZ) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). TNC 
arrived to support the SEMMAS by delimiting properties through CAR. All 
these measures have led to a significant reduction of deforestation since 2005 
but there are still numerous challenges to the exit of São Felix from the list of 
the “Fire Arch”.  
 
A representative of TNC explained to us that the government regulation did 
not support small farmers to transition towards a low carbon economy. Many 
farmers have the will to reduce deforestation but they cannot make the 
transition towards alternatives to cattle because they are lacking technical and 
financial means. For farmers to reduce deforestation, they need technicians to 
explain to them how to produce cocoa, fruits and vegetables, but also how to 
increase their returns from their products. A representative of the SEMA in 
São Felix explained that technical assistance in the municipality lacked human 
and financial capacities to support a larger number of farmers. The public 
technical assistance organization Emater has only six technicians, one car and 
one motorcycle to support the 6000 small-scale farmers of the municipality of 
the size of Austria. Small-scale farmers lack the money to pay for private 
technical assistance from Cootagro or Procampo, so these organisms count 
with five technicians in total now.  
 
Another challenge to a further reduction of deforestation is the high 
rotation of properties, a result of the insecurity of property rights. In São 
Felix, only 2% of the farmers have an official property right. An employee at 
BASA explains that farmers are used to buy a property with forest, deforest it 
and cultivate their cattle on the pastures and then sell it to buy a new property. 
This recurrent buying and selling of properties prevents them from having a 
long-term vision of their property, says a representative of Procampo. 
Moreover, as long as they do not have a property right of their land, farmers 
cannot be held accountable for any illegal deforestation, according to our 
interviewee of the Cootagro. The official property right allows farmers to 
have access to official credits, except for the Pronaf, which small farmers can 
have access to with a Declaration emitted by Emater or STTR.  
 
Thus, the difficulty of transport and the strong cattle culture reduce the 
farmers’ motivation to change their practices. The lack of technical assistance 
and credits in São Felix but also the unaccomplished land reform are two 
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additional major challenges to reduce deforestation. To have a more detailed 
vision on the needs of the farmers to be able to further reduce deforestation, 
we carried out the interviews with the farmers.  
5 Characterisation of the diversity of farmers  
The aim of this part is to understand how the farmers perceive the transition 
towards sustainable alternatives and what would be necessary for them to 
engage on this path. Among the results of the questionnaires with the Q 
methodology, we identified certain common tendencies and some 
heterogeneous responses (see Annexe for the responses of the interviews).     
5.1 General tendencies of farmers in São Felix  
Firstly, the 14 small farmers we interviewed agree on their desire to stay on 
their property because they like it, and not because they have no other 
employment options. They also want to improve the property and make it 
more profitable for their sons and grandsons. Given that traditionally, the 
municipality of São Felix do Xingu is characterised by high rotation rates of 
the properties, these answers can show that people would like to stay but are 
not always able to, but they might also reveal a change in mentalities in the 
past years. Instead of opening new agricultural frontiers, farmers would now 
prefer to increase the rents on their own properties.  
 
Secondly, they all asserted that they agree they do not have the right to 
manage their properties as they please, but that certain rules are essential, and 
those who cause damage to the environment should be punished. While they 
extract resources to satisfy their immediate needs, these answers reflect that 
they are conscious that they have to change their practices in their own 
interest. This could be the result either of awareness-raising efforts by the 
municipality, or of the direct feeling of the environmental damage and its 
health impacts themselves. Most notably, many inhabitants of São Felix 
related months of large dust and smoke clouds in the 1990s, which caused 
respiratory problems, eye irritation and low visibility. Since 2009, with the 
change of policies against deforestation, this problem has greatly decreased, 
probably thanks to a combination of both the awareness and the health factors. 
Most farmers we interviewed cooperated with the Adafax, which offers them 
technical assistance and raises awareness, but this change in awareness was 
also true among the farmers who do not get support of the Adafax.  
 
Thirdly, the interviewed farmers are all eager to discover practices, which 
would allow them to stop deforesting (except for one, who justified that his 
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lack of money did not enable him to look for new practices). They know that 
if they could produce more or make a transition towards new types of 
production, they would not need to deforest anymore. To engage in this 
transition, they all explained that they needed technical assistance and credits. 
They seem to be well conscious that they do not have the right to deforest any 
longer, or at least not to the same extent, but the government has not provided 
the necessary means for them to actually change their production models.  
 
Lastly, between a financial and a technical support to reduce deforestation, 
they all think that the technical support is at least as important as a regular 
payment, if not more.  
5.2 Identification of three main profiles of farmers  
Despite these general tendencies, a more detailed analysis reveals clearly that 
the farmers are too diverse to establish a one-fits-it-all solution. 
 
Given the divergence of some of the answers, we classified the 14 farmers in 
three different profiles, based on the most divergent answers to opinion 
statements. We obtained very divergent answers to opinion statements 6 (“For 
me it is easier to adapt to environmental regulation than for other farmers”), 
which reflects the different capacities of farmers to change their practices. Other 
controversial opinions were statements 8 (“I think that deforesting is the only way 
for me to produce sufficiently”) and 9 (“I think that I could earn enough without 
having to deforest”). This showed that some farmers still consider they have to 
deforest and to open new pastures for their cattle, while others have already 
started to diversify their production. Farmers also answered heterogeneously to 
opinion statements 11 (“I stopped deforesting because of the frequent controls 
and sanctions”) and 12 (“I stopped deforesting because I like my forest”), which 
enabled us to differentiate the farmers according to their motivation to stop 
deforesting.  Last but not least, we obtained divergent answers to opinion 
statement 21 (“My biggest problem is to sell the production”). Here, farmers who 
agreed to this statement had clearly already started to diversify their production 
and had thus different needs from those who prioritized technical assistance and 
new credit lines.   
 
It is important to note that given our small sample size, this categorisation 
is only explorative and has no statistical validity. Nonetheless, the inductive 
categories served as a basis for a more general reflexion on the diversity of 
farmers, which is independent of the categorisation we used. We also want to 
specify that the names of the categories do not imply any judgment on the 
different farmers and is only used to differentiate their preferences.  
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Profile 1: The Environmentalists 
 
For these six farmers, deforesting is not the only way to produce 
sufficiently and they consider that they can earn enough revenue without 
deforesting. They like the forest, are very much aware of the importance of 
the environment and do not consider that they have a right to deforest only 
because they produce food for others. They agree to stop deforestation and 
have already stopped. They do not consider that the new environmental 
regulation of the federal government prevents them from staying on their 
property and feel that they can better adapt to this regulation than other 
farmers. In fact, they think that the existing environmental regulation is not 
yet sufficient. They have stopped deforesting because they like their forests, 
and not because of the controls and sanctions. Their biggest problem is to sell 
their production, which shows that they are already producing alternatives to 
cattle.  
 
The financial profitability of the different agricultural activities is not the 
only factor in determining their production model; they can actually afford to 
take other factors into account, such as environmental protection or 
sustainability. They claim that preserving the forests has benefits for them 
even if they do not obtain any payments for it.  
 
Profile 2: The Innovators  
 
These five farmers are motivated to make a transition towards new types of 
production, such as cocoa or fruit, but they cannot yet afford to invest in them 
(some of them just started planting cocoa but are still waiting for the first 
harvest). They agree that they ought to stop deforesting and think that the 
existing environmental regulation is not sufficient, however they consider that 
they still need to deforest small areas to be able to survive. Some of the 
farmers who stopped deforesting told us that this led to a decrease of their 
already low incomes. They are aware that they need to increase their 
production and develop new types of production to be able to stop 
deforesting, but they do not know how to change their practices or do not 
have the means for it. They stopped deforesting because they like their forests.  
 
They do not consider that it is easier for them than for other farmers to 
adapt to environmental regulation. Financial profitability of their production 
determines their decisions for the property because they are all very 
dependent on their income. Forests are not particularly beneficial for them if 
they do not receive payments but this was not a priority in their responses 
(many were either indifferent or disagreed with the opinion statement 25 (??), 
 18 
none of them strongly disagreed). They would invest the payment in their 
property rather than in cloths or food, or would do both to the same extent.   
 
Profile 3: The Objectors  
 
These three farmers do absolutely not know how they could stop 
deforesting. For them, deforesting is the only way to earn enough, given that 
they claim that without deforesting, they could not earn sufficiently and could 
not stay on their properties. One of them told us that there are already way too 
many environmental regulations. They would only stop deforesting because 
of the controls and sanctions. Selling their production is not a major problem 
for them yet, because they still rely on cattle-farming only. However, as all 
the other farmers, they agree that they need new production types and 
technical assistance to be able to reduce deforestation.  
 
They consider it harder for them to adapt to environmental regulation than 
for other farmers. Their decisions are clearly determined by financial 
profitability, which is due to their very low income. Thus, they consider that 
forests do not bear any benefits for them if they do not obtain payments to 
maintain them. As for the question of what they would use such a payment 
for, results were not clear; one of them preferred to invest in cloths and food, 
the other would invest in his property and the last one would do both equally.  
6 Causes and consequences of this categorisation  
6.1 Characteristics of small farmers as explaining factors for their 
categorisation   
Before confronting the farmers with the opinion statements of the Q 
methodology, we asked them about the distance to the town of São Felix do 
Xingu, their types of production, the proportion of forest they had on their 
property and the support they got from Adafax. These questions allowed us to 
collect information on the characteristics of the farmers, which could 
contribute to explain the divergence between the profiles. However, although 
we identified correlations between their characteristics and their type of 
profile, the causality link is not always clear and could be reverse.  
 
The first explaining factor is the distance to the town of São Felix. The 
Environmentalists all live in communities close to São Felix, while the 
farmers from the two other categories live much further from the centre of the 
municipality. Thus, the Environmentalists have better access to environment-
related information and to technical assistance.  
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The diversity of cultivated products is another factor, which is correlated to 
the different categories. The Environmentalists all cultivate and sell fruits, 
vegetables and cocoa, along with cattle farming (and one does not have any 
cattle anymore). The Innovators with little resources only sell cattle and plan 
to sell cocoa, even though some have fruits and vegetables for their personal 
consumption. The Objectors are still very much focused on cattle farming. 
The distance to São Felix is actually linked to the types of production because 
fruits and vegetables can only be sold in the centre, while cacao cooperatives 
are more decentralised. However, the diversity of products is not necessarily 
the explaining factor for their categorisation as Environmentalists, it could be 
that they were aware of the environmental constraints and thus decided to 
diversify their production.  
 
Another explaining factor of the farmers’ diversity is the share of forest 
remaining on their property. The Environmentalists’ properties have a reduced 
forest cover (around 20-30%), while the Innovators and the Objectors still 
have large forest areas on their properties (between 50 and 90%). Therefore, it 
is easier for the Environmentalists to diversify their production; they have 
more deforested areas and cannot deforest any more their properties. 
However, the loss of the forest may also have enhanced their awareness of 
environmental problems, which stem from the absence of forest (dry streams, 
increase of drought and heat, etc.). It would be interesting to have 
complementary information on their willingness to reforest part of their 
property, to better understand whether having forest on their property is really 
important to them. 
 
Lastly, the participation of farmers in networks and unions favours their 
environmental awareness. The farmers who are members of the Adafax or of 
the Managing Council of the Environmental Protection Area of Triunfo 
(APA) tend to favour sustainable production and are willing to make efforts 
towards these alternatives. However, they may also have decided to cooperate 
with these networks given that they were aware of the need to stop 
deforesting. Moreover, for this last factor, the correlation was not as clear 
because some who already started diversifying their production do not 
cooperate with Adafax while the three Objectors have been cooperating with 
Adafax for several years.  
 
These few factors are not representative because of the small sample size. 
A full characterisation of a larger sample of farmers and an analysis of a wider 
range of factors would be needed to fully explain the categorisation.  
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6.2 The farmers’ needs according to their profiles and implications for a 
REDD+ project 
The results we obtained in the interviews point to divergent needs of the 
farmers to be able to stop deforesting. This divergence will be used as a basis 
for a broader reflection on the diversity of farmers and its implications.  
 
The Environmentalists explained that they mainly needed more 
commercialisation possibilities for their new types of production, such as 
fruits. For example, when we talked to farmers belonging to the Association 
of Women Producing Fruit Pulp (AMPPF), they related that the biggest 
challenge they faced was that they did not have electricity in their 
communities, so they could not transform the fruit into pulp. Due to the bad 
state of the roads, the fruit cannot be transported to the next community. 
Therefore, the Environmentalists wish they had the support of cooperatives, 
which would come to the communities to buy the fruit, on top of a better 
infrastructure in terms of roads and electricity. In their production system, 
they are initiating a transition towards Agro-Forestry Systems (SAFs), which 
are complex and expensive to put in place, so they also ask for more technical 
assistance and more credit opportunities. Considering the Environmentalists’ 
who already stopped deforesting, a REDD+ project focused on use-restricting 
payments would not be effective for them to increase their revenue, 
preventing that they stop deforesting again. It rather has to be part of a policy 
mix enabling municipal investment to improve commercialisation of new 
products that farmers are already producing. Technical assistance and new 
credit opportunities would allow them to increase the scale of their fruit and 
cocoa production, increase their incomes but also encourage them to create 
innovative systems such as SAFs.   
 
The Innovators are willing to change their practices but lack the technical 
knowledge and financial means to make the transition towards sustainable 
alternatives to cattle, therefore they greatly need technical assistance and new 
credit opportunities. For them, a REDD+ project should contribute to tackle 
the lack of personnel, vehicles and equipment of the technical assistance 
organisms in the municipality. In the public technical assistance institution, 
Emater, the representative told us that some subsidized credit lines already 
existed to support farmers in diversifying their production (the Pronaf 
Floresta), but that they have never been used in São Felix because the 
organisms did not know how to create a project that corresponds to the 
credits’ conditions. Once farmers diversify their production to cocoa, fruits 
and other products, they may eventually become Environmentalists and will 
then require support for the commercialisation of these new products as well.   
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Regarding the Objectors, it would be important to address their perception 
of deforestation, given that they still consider it as absolutely necessary. A 
series of workshops and courses could make them become aware of the 
productive benefits of standing forests (in terms of water and shadow), the 
profitable alternatives to cattle farming and the possibility of innovative 
systems such as SAFs. Given that they affirmed that the forest did not have 
any benefits if they did not obtain payments for its conservation, and that 
deforesting is the only way to produce sufficiently, an initial use-restricting 
payment under a REDD+ project could be necessary to dissuade them from 
deforesting on the short-term. However, for equity reasons, it is questionable 
whether it is legitimate to pay only the Objectors who have not done any 
efforts until now to reduce their deforestation and diversify their production, 
contrarily to the Environmentalists. Moreover, the Forest Code approved in 
2012 clearly sets the limits of allowed deforestation, which questions the 
legality of such a payment if it concerns the reserve already determined by 
law. Anyways, once they have the will to change their practices and to stop 
deforesting, the Objectors would need technical assistance and new credit 
opportunities to be able to diversify their production and increase their rents. 
It is also possible that once they start the diversification process and they 
realize how profitable new production types such as cocoa can be, they will 
not need any awareness raising or payments anymore. It has to be noted that 
while the production of cocoa is currently highly profitable, there is a high 
uncertainty as to its future price, so it can be riskier in the long-term.   
Our results can be summarized in the following table.  
Table 1. Categorisation of farmers  
Profile Environmentalists Innovators Objectors 
Position on 
deforestation 
They want to change their 
practices or already changed 
them  
They would like to 
change their practices but do 
not have the means to do so 
They do not want to 
change their practices 
Conditions 
Proximity to São Felix 
High diversification  
Little forest 
 Medium distance to SFX 
Almost no diversification 
Large forest areas 
Large distance to SFX 
No diversification  
Large forest areas 
Needs 
Better commercialisation 
and infrastructure 
TA and credit lines  
TA + credits lines 
Then commercialisation 
Awareness raising 
Then TA + credit lines 
+ Commercialisation 
Implications 
for REDD+ 
Strengthening of 
decentralized cooperatives  
Capacity-building of TA 
organisms and banking 
institutions 
Awareness raising 
workshops and capacity-
building of TA organisms 
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7 Discussion  
Our results suggest that a REDD+ project might be more effective if it 
consisted of investments in supportive asset-building activities rather than 
individual use-restricting payments. We also showed that for this investment, 
there is no one-fits-it-all solution. Investments to improve commercialisation 
and infrastructure, technical assistance and new credit opportunities should 
intervene to different extents at different moments of the transition to address 
the farmers’ needs, and thus efficiently address the current drivers of 
deforestation.   
 
This diversity of the farmers’ needs has various implications for the 
definition of the governance of a REDD+ project. In the following part, we 
will show that such a flexible REDD+ scheme, based on investments at the 
municipal level, might be more equitable. Nevertheless, the control of the 
conditionality becomes much more difficult in such a scheme than in an 
individual use-restricting payment scheme, given the complexity to sanction 
or to exclude farmers in the case of non-respect of the contract.  
 
7.1 Equity implications 
Equity in the context of a REDD+ project generally refers to its social risks 
and its effects on poverty. There is a voluminous literature on the perceived 
social risks of PES and REDD+. While the exhaustive list of social risks (see 
for example Bond et al. 2009; Grieg-Gran et al. 2005; Peskett et al. 2008) is 
beyond the scope of this study, equity may be significantly improved in an 
investment scheme.  
 
How the project can expand production activities is a critical question when 
defining the exact modalities of a REDD+. Payments may disadvantage the 
poor because it is most difficult for them to find profitable activities without 
relying on resource extraction. As observed by Wunder (2008), a key 
determinant of the net livelihood and income effects is whether a PES activity 
is restrictive as regards current production activities, or whether it promotes or 
expands them. Our results suggest that tackling the specific needs of the small 
farmers to allow them to increase their income may be a better way to exit 
poverty than using use-restricting payments. This is also confirmed by Bond 
et al. (2009), for example, who argue that large-scale ‘set aside’ conservation 
projects can depress local incomes and harm the non-participating rural poor.  
 
Another crucial aspect of individual payments playing against equity is its 
reliance on opportunity cost. As shown by Karsenty (2012), use-restricting 
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PES schemes based on individual payments are based on the average 
opportunity cost of the community. However, the opportunity cost of the 
resource-dependent poor is higher than this estimated average opportunity 
cost. On the other hand, an asset-building investment should be considered 
because it could benefit small-scale farmers, regardless of their generally low 
opportunity cost.  
 
This finding is confirmed by Sommerville et al. (2010), who show that 
techniques such as offering in-kind, non-rival and non-excludable incentives 
may avert benefit capture by a small group and ensure access to the poor. In 
many rural communities, directing incentives (such as payments) explicitly to 
the poor may lead to upsetting local social structures (Agrawal, 2001; 
Thompson and Homewood, 2002). This distributional issue is addressed in 
the Menabe in Madagascar through the use of in-kind incentives that are 
shared by the community, including bicycles, generators and public buildings 
(Summerville et al. 2010).  
 
However, in some cases meeting individual opportunity costs is deemed 
important to incentivize individual behaviour and to increase the perception of 
fairness (Fehr and Falk 2002). Targeting may be an approach to improve the 
environmental efficiency of the intervention. In our study, we concluded that 
targeting was essential to address the different needs of the farmers, the same 
in-kind incentives such as technical assistance won’t be efficient for all 
farmers.  
 
Whether the differentiated support is pro-poor will probably depend on the 
situation, but it is a factor that needs to be taken into account. Generally, the 
poorest are lagging behind in the transition, due to their lack of resources for 
the initial investment into alternative production types. Thus, they would 
benefit more of the support than those who already managed to increase their 
income through new production types. In our study, the objectors benefit of 
awareness raising seminars, technical assistance, new credit lines and 
commercialization, while the environmentalists only benefit of 
commercialization. There would probably be no resentment about this 
difference because environmentalists do not need the other forms of support, 
while resentment would be important if we had a differentiated payment. For 
this reason, investment could be differentiated and still more equitable than 
the payment.  
 
How to categorize the farmers to decide upon the differentiated support is 
another challenging equity issue. There are various challenges to targeting 
particularly in developing countries, due to the difficulty of extracting private 
information from individuals seeking to receive benefits (Akerlof, 1970). 
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Techniques such as screening contracts can be used to induce individuals to 
share their true preferences and to complement publically available 
information on opportunity costs (Ferraro, 2008). Alternatively, spatial 
targeting has been explored for the distribution of incentives and may be 
appropriate for those with land directly adjacent to forest (Wätzold and 
Drechsler, 2005; Wünscher et al., 2008). However, such forms of targeting 
typically involve relatively high transaction costs. This demonstrates the 
importance of finding an adequate targeting method to distribute the 
differentiated support in an equitable manner.  
 
Through targeting, it is possible to attribute different levels of support to 
the farmers according to their needs to reduce deforestation. Those who 
already stopped deforesting have no needs to reduce their deforestation, and 
from an environmentally efficiency perspective, there is no need to include 
them in the project. In our study, this is the case for the environmentalists. 
Investing REDD+ funds for them does not further reduce emissions from 
deforestation, so there is no additionality. However, excluding those who 
protected the forest in the past and rewarding those who did not poses another 
equity problem, raised by Kaimowitz (2008). Given that compensation is 
based on progress against historical baselines, there is limited scope to reward 
past successful conservation efforts, mostly by indigenous people and 
traditional communities (Kaimowitz 2008). On the other hand, large ranching 
businesses still represent a large threat to deforestation, so compensation for 
them would be very effective form an environmental point of view (Ibid). 
This in turn can lead to “perverse incentives”, if the farmers who deforest 
most today receive most compensation tomorrow.  
 
As a possible way out of this dilemma, previous efforts in the 
compensation scheme could be included. In São Felix do Xingu, even the 
environmentalists who already stopped deforestation still face various 
challenges to a permanent reduction of deforestation, most notably the 
commercialization of their products. If a REDD+ project could support the 
creation of cooperatives with vehicles, it would indirectly support the 
reduction of deforestation. Not only would it ensure that environmentalists 
permanently cease to deforest because they expand their other production 
types and increase their income, but it would also be a strong signal for 
innovators and objectors that the transition is feasible and profitable. 
According to Pagiola et al. (2004), the World Bank’s Regional Integrated 
Silvopastoral Ecosystem Management Project (RISEMP) for example, which 
combines payments with technical assistance to encourage a transition from 
pastures to silvo-pastures, was adjusted over time to recompense those 
farmers who had already protected or planted forest on their pastures before 
the beginning of the project. Moreover, it has to be noted that while it can be 
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considered as environmentally ineffective to include environmentalists who 
already stopped deforesting, because there is no additionality in terms of 
deforestation reduction in the short term, the investment in commercialization 
support will benefit the other categories as well, as they progress on their 
transition. The prospect of a viable exploitation without deforesting may be of 
importance for the innovators and objectors, who are still deforesting.  
 
Thus, an investment scheme, which favours both the poorest farmers and 
those who protected the forest in the past by tackling their specific needs 
would significantly increase equity. However, this scheme is certainly not a 
sufficient condition for combining a reduction of deforestation with an exit 
from poverty. Complementary pro-poor policies, including reinforcing the 
land tenure rights and strengthening local institutions, are also essential for 
the success of REDD+ (Meridian Institute 2011; Bond et al. 2009). 
 
7.2 Control of the conditionality  
Based on the concept of PES, the REDD+ mechanism aims at establishing a 
conditionality between the different types of support and the conservation of 
the environmental services provided by a standing forest. However, for 
conditionality to be efficient, it involves control. Once a contract is 
established between the farmer and the authority responsible for the REDD+ 
project (an NGO, a public local institution…), its rules and conditions have to 
be respected. Given that the investments in supportive activities ought to be 
used not only to reduce deforestation but also to diversify the production, 
control become particularly critical. The role of institutions to provide a 
mechanism to organize and coordinate control and supervision is thus 
reinforced through an investment-oriented scheme.  
 
How to be sure that the farmers who benefit from these services actually 
stop deforesting is a crucial question. There is a dichotomy between various 
control options: On the one hand, satellite control, often seen as a silver bullet 
for monitoring, is actually not able to evidence small deforested areas. By 
delimitating the properties and assign them clearly to their proprietors, one of 
the main purposes of the CAR is to allow monitoring of these small areas. 
However, the CAR is a macro control approach, which does not preclude site 
visits for small properties. In the PES scheme in Costa Rica for example, 
monitoring is conducted via site visits, as participating areas tend to be small 
and not easily monitored with remote sensing. Monitoring responsibilities are 
delegated to regentes, who, along with technical personnel of FONAFIFO, are 
authorized to visit the property at any time to certify that it is still under 
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conservation (Manual de Procedimientos 2009). This effective solution can be 
an important lesson for any future REDD+ projects.   
 
Advances in contract theory, mechanism design, game theory and related 
fields now allow to say that for monitoring, the state is attractive because it 
alone has the power to make and enforce the rules of the game. Communities, 
however, may solve problems that the states are ill-equipped to address, 
especially where the nature of social interactions or of the goods and services 
being transacted makes contracting highly incomplete or costly (Bowles and 
Gintis 2002). In our study, we showed that this was the case in the very large 
municipality of São Felix, which suffers of a lack of resources for effective 
monitoring. Community governance relies on dispersed private information 
often unavailable to states, employers, banks, and other large formal 
organisations to apply rewards and punishments to members according to 
their conformity with or deviation from social norms (Bowles and Gintis 
2002). An effective community monitors the behaviour of its members, 
rendering them accountable for their actions. In contrast to states, 
communities foster and use the incentives that people have traditionally 
deployed to regulate their common activity: trust, solidarity, reciprocity, 
reputation, personal pride, respect, vengeance, and retribution, among other, 
as shown by Bowles and Gintis (2002).  
 
Communities overcome free-rider problems set by their members by 
directly punishing ‘anti-social’ actions of others. Monitoring and punishment 
by peers in work teams, credit associations, partnerships, local common 
situations, and residential neighbourhoods is often an effective means of 
attenuating incentive problems that arise where individual actions affecting 
the well being of others are not subject to enforceable contracts (Whyte 1955; 
Homans 1961; Ostrom 1990; Tilly 1981; Hossain 1988; Dong and Dow 1993; 
Sampson et al. 1997). However, in order to create this interest in the actions 
of others, actors have to be directly affected by the behaviour of others, like 
for common pool resources. If the support only depends on the individual 
performance, other actors won’t be affected by the non-respect of the contract 
by others. Thus, community members do not have any interest in controlling 
the other farmers. Any REDD+ will need to consider how to create a group 
conditionality, which incentivizes actors to monitor other members of their 
community. 
 
The existing literature has come to two suggestions: first, the person 
denouncing the infringing farmer could obtain a reward. However, some 
authors argue that a personal repayment is not even necessary (Bowles and 
Gintis 2002). They argue that communities are often capable of enforcing 
norms, because a considerable fraction of members are willing to engage in 
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the costly punishment of shirkers even when there is no reasonable 
expectation of being personally repaid for their efforts. The authors call this 
behaviour “strong reciprocity”. A strong reciprocator is predisposed to co-
operate with others and punish non-cooperators, even when this behaviour 
cannot be justified in terms of self-interest. The considerable evidence that 
strong reciprocity motives are common is reviewed in Bowles and Gintis 
(2000). We suggest that making the municipal in-kind investment conditional 
on the performance of the entire municipality could be an interesting option 
could reinforce this reciprocity. 
 
Verifying performance related to diversification efforts is more complex 
because external factors play a more important role. There is a risk that if the 
farmer did not successfully plant a field of cocoa, it can be due to hostile 
ground or bad advice by the technical assistance organism (and not due to his 
lack of efforts). One of the farmers we interviewed tried to plant cocoa two 
consecutive years with the support of Adafax, but was not successful. Thus, 
factors leading to the possible failure of diversification are highly uncertain 
and in the case of a municipal conditionality (as suggested before), the other 
members should not be sanctioned for this failure. This is why Karsenty 
(2012) suggest that performance should be understood in a broad sense to 
encompass a mix of indicators based on the effective and sustained 
implementation of forest-related policies and investments in the community, 
while some elements of performance (like forest cover and forest 
fragmentation) can be considered as “proxies” for reduced emissions. For 
example, incentivising government investment to clarify and secure tenure 
rights and remove the legal incentives to deforest for securing land tenure, 
would appear as a prerequisite to prevent “land-grabbing” and enable a range 
of measures targeted at integrated forest and agriculture public policies and 
sustainable community forestry (Ibid). Focusing on the actual increase of the 
supportive activities could be fairer than only accounting for the results in 
terms of reduced deforestation or actual diversification.  
 
Sanctions are important to encourage compliance with the program terms 
and to deter fraud. In the context of national PES programs, sanctions 
generally include suspension or cancellation of payments, and potentially the 
requirement that past payments be returned. These modalities can serve as 
interesting lessons for REDD+ projects. In Mexico’s Payments for 
Hydrological Services program, which has now been merged with the national 
PES program, the contract differentiated between intentional and 
unintentional land conversion. Specifically, while any loss of forest cover 
would result in a loss of payments for the affected area, unaffected areas 
would still be eligible for payment if the loss occurred through no fault of the 
landowner (World Bank 2012). In Ecuador’s Socio Bosque program of 
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conservation incentives launched in 2008, incentives will be suspended in 
cases of minor non-compliance, and can be terminated in cases of continued 
minor noncompliance (resulting in suspension on more than three consecutive 
occasions) or major compliance problems that affect the conservation area 
(Manual Operativo 2009). The Ministry of Environment also reserves the 
right to sanction logging or destruction of native forest or other native 
vegetation, and to determine the cost of restitution in accordance with 
applicable law (Manual Operativo 2009). 
 
However, the problem is that sanctions are only theoretically available, 
because it is not clearly defined that constitutes non-compliance, nor do the 
relevant documents describe procedures for applying sanctions. As yet, 
sanctions of any kind have been applied occasionally, if at all, to non-
complying participants in any of the three programs analyzed, because of high 
compliance levels, inadequate verification, or both (World Bank 2012). 
Controversial sanctions such as requiring that past payments be returned or 
imposing newly-enacted penalties, have not been an issue because they have 
not been used (Ibid).  
 
On the other hand, the use of fines and sanctions is controversial because it 
can undermine reciprocity or other social motives, especially if these 
sanctions mobilize self-interested motives of compliance (Fehr and Gächter 
2000, Bewley 1995; Gneezy and Rustichini 2000; Cardenas et al. 2000), as 
well as other sources cited in Bowles (1998). 
8 Conclusion 
To reconcile the reduction of deforestation, which was enforced as a legal 
obligation in recent years, with increased income, farmers are making their 
way towards a transition from slash-and-burn practices and implantation of 
cattle pastures towards sustainable production types. These include cocoa, 
fruit and vegetables in the case of São Felix do Xingu, but there are also many 
other ways to reduce deforestation, such as the intensification of pastures, 
which allows more cattle on the land, the production milk or mechanization of 
agricultural productions.  
 
In this study, we showed that in the municipality of São Felix, the 
challenges to such a transition is the lack of knowledge about the alternatives, 
technical support, financial means and commercialization of these new 
products. These challenges were not rightfully addressed by the regulation 
approach of the federal government. A REDD+ project, financed by the 
international community like the TNC pilot project or by a market could 
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contribute to address these flaws and encourage small farmers to effectively 
make this transition.  
 
Our results lead to the conclusion that a REDD+ project should consist of 
investments into supportive asset-building activities rather than individual 
use-restricting payments, but that there is no one-fits-it-all solution. Small 
farmers have different characteristics and needs according to their stage on the 
transition. Only if the specific needs of the different categories of farmers are 
met, the farmers will be able to transition towards sustainable alternatives. 
This implies a governance scheme, which guarantees equity while enabling a 
control of the conditionality.  
 
This diversity of the farmers’ perceptions can be better understood if we 
consider the transition towards sustainable alternatives as a complex process, 
and the farmers’ needs vary according to their position in this process. Based 
on this divergence of the farmers’ needs according to their profile, the debate 
on REDD+ should not be limited to whether it should consist of a payment or 
not, but involve a reflexion on which moment of the transition such a payment 
or other supporting activities could be effective.  
 
However, it is important to note that REDD+ is not a silver bullet solution 
for all drivers of deforestation, and one highly debated issue currently is the 
exact role the instrument will play within the framework of deforestation 
policies, which has also some exclusive competences. While some authors 
argue it should be limited to a compensation to even out the negative impacts 
of deforestation reduction policies, others consider that the REDD+ 
instrument should become a structuring part of the policy against 
deforestation. It could also play the role of an overall framework of 
deforestation reduction policies.  
 
1 Adafax was created in 2004 with the support of the Gret to support small farmers technically 
but also represent them politically. The association emerged from the cooperation of three local 
entities: the Pastoral Commission of the Land (CPT), dealing with the land reform; the Rural 
Family House, focusing on the education of the youth; and the Cappru, cooperative for the 
promotion and commercialization of cacao. These three entities decided to create the Adafax to 
represent small farmers and help them face their challenges. 
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